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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EMIL J. JACOBSON et ux., 
. Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
GEORGE W. SWAN et ux., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 8050 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants are, by this appeal, .asking the Court to con-
strue two so-called leases with options to re-purchase, executed 
subsequent to a uniform real estate contract for the purchase 
of a home and lot, and incorporating in them that contract, 
as in fact extensions and modifications of the original contract, 
and upon such construction, to relieve the appellants, pur-
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In June, 1947, the property involved in this case was listed 
by its then owner, P. K. Neilson, with the Dixon Real Estate 
Co1npany of Provo, Utah, for sale (R. 94). The respondent 
l~n1il J. Jacobson, who was at that time a salesman for the 
real estate company, showed it to appellants for the purpose 
of selling it to them (R. 94, Jacobson's Deposition 2). After 
some negotiation, the sale was consummated on June 27, 1947, 
in the following manner. The total sale price was $14,000.00. 
The appellants paid P. K. Neilson $4,000.00, and the re-
spondents gave him $10,000.00. P. K. Neilson then gaye the 
respondents, Jacobsons, a warranty deed, with them as gran-
tees, and the J acobsons in turn executed the usual uniform 
real estate contract as vendors, reciting the total purchase price 
of~$14,000.00, acknowledging receipt of the $4,000.00 as down 
payment, and providing for monthly payments on principal and 
interest of $80.00 per month (R. 94-5, Swan's Deposition 
2-4, Jacobson's Deposition 1-13). The contract contained the 
usual provisions that the vendees, appellants, pay insurance, 
taxes, assessments and the like. It also contained, among other 
things, the usual forfeiture. clause, examined by this Court in 
Perks v. Spencer (1952) ____ Utah ____ , 243 P. 2d 466 (R. 13, 
Ps' Ex. F). 
By March, 1949, appellants had become in arrears in pay-
ments. The amount was disputed, but jury found that appel-
lants had at that time paid a total of $5,060.00 toward principal 
and interest (R. 63). Had they kept such payments cu~rent, 
they would at that time have paid toward principal and in-
terest the surn~ of $5,520.00. The jury found further that 
appellants had paid nothing toward taxes and assessments, 
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insurance premiu:ms, or attorney's fees (R. 63,). On March 11, 
1949, appellants were served with a notice to quit the prem-
ises (Ds' Ex. 4, R. 95). It is here noted that this notice was 
not in the alternative, as required by Utah law. Pacific De-
velopnzent Co. t'. Stetvart (1948) 113 Utah 403, 195 P. 2d 748. 
T~ereafter, some time in April, 1949, a so:.called lease 
was drawn up by Mr. Clyde D. Sandgren as attorney for the . 
respondents, and executed by them and the appellants (R. 
95-6, Ps' Ex. G). 
This document recited the execution of the uniform real 
estate contract of June 27; 1947, and incorporated that contract 
in it. It then recited the default in payments, that the appel-
lants were tenants at will, but that the respondents were willing. 
to lease the premises in question on the terms in that agreement. 
It then provided that the respondents lease the premises to the 
appellants '((on a month-to-month basis for a period· commenc-
ing May 1, 1949, ·and ending no later than April 30, 1950," 
· fo~ a rental of $100.00 per month. Of this sum, $80.00 was to 
be credited as rental and $20.00 was to be credited to the 
amount delinquent under the uniform real estate contract. 
The lessees (appellants) were to pay all taxes, assessments, in-
surance premiums, etc., during the period of the so-called lease. 
Then came a most interesting provision: 
In the event that the Lessees shall pay the amounts 
specified in the foregoing paragraph at the times they 
are due, respectively, the Lessors hereby agree that they 
will enter into a new real estate sales contract with 
the Lessees in similar form to the one attached, which 
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new contract will recite a purchase price of $14,000.00 
and give credit for all amounts already paid on the 
principal, including those paid under the original con-
lrttct as well as payments to be made under this agree-
1Jient. (Emphasis added.) 
T'he so-called lease further recited that it was made to afford 
the appellants a reasonable opportunity to reinstate their right 
to purchase the property, but to save to the lessors the right 
to remove them as tenants a will in the event they did not 
abide by its terms. It further provided that costs of enforce-
ment would be borne by. the party at fault, and that the agree-
ment should bind the heirs, executors, administrators and 
assigns of the parties. 
By April, 1950, appellants were in arrears on payments 
under this first lease agreement in the amount of $287.41 
(R. 81, 96). This sum was paid to respondents by appellants · 
(R. 81), and the first lease agreement expired by its own terms 
April 30, 1950. The jury found that under that first lease agree-
ment the appellants had paid to the respondents $1,440.00 
toward principal and interest, $109.41 taxes, $78.00 as prem-
ium on a three-year insurance policy, and $100.00 to Clyde 
D. Sandgren as attorney's fees. All sums required to· be paid 
by appellants under this first lease agreement were in fact 
paid (R. 81). 
The respondents' attorney, Clyde D. Sandgren, then 
drafted another so-called lease agreement, herein denominated 
the second lease agreement, executed by the parties on June 
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In general plan this second lease agreement was much 
like the first. It referred to the uniform real estate contract 
of June 27, 1947, and incorporated that contract in it. It re-
cited the defaults and the fact of the first lease agreement. 
Respondents then leased the premises to appellants ((on a 
month-to-month basis for a period commencing September 1, 
1950, and ending May 31, 1953." Appellants were to pay 
therefor $100.00 per month for the three year period, and 
were to pay all insurance premiums, taxes, assessments, etc., 
during that time. 
The document then provided that, m the event the ap-
pellants performed all the conditions therein contained, a new 
real estate contract would be entered into, with respondents 
as vendors and appellants as purchasers, reciting a purchase 
price of $14,000.00, and giving appellants credit for all sums . 
paid under the real estate contract of June 27, 1947, the first 
lease agreement of April ____ , 1949, and the second lease agree~ 
ment of June 27, 1950. 
This second lease agreement contained one additional 
provision not in the first. It stated that if the rent were not paid 
as therein provided, then the lessors (respondents) could re-
enter, re-let the premises, nand apply the net proceeds so re-
ceived upon the amount due under this lease." If we were to 
concede that this document was a lease, this would certainly 
make it look like a term tenancy. This, we believe, is important 
because of the kind of notice to quit given the appellants. 
By March, 1952, appellants were in arrears under this 
second lease agreement (R. 21, Swan's Deposition 7). The jury 
found that, to that time they had made payment to the re-
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sponddents tot~ling $1,900.00 (R. 63). The jury credited this 
to "principal and interest" because that was the phraseology 
of the interrogatory, but if the appellants were in fact tenants, 
it would appear this should have been (trent." They found that 
nothing had been paid toward taxes and assessments, insur~ 
ance premiums, or attorney's fees. 
On March 5, 1952, there was served upon appellants a 
further notice to quit (R. 52, Ds' Ex. 5). This notice was to. 
quit mere I y, without alternative. Although the appellants 
pleaded that a tender of sums due at that time was made at 
once, and this fact was in issue, the trial court refused. to submit 
this question to the jury, and refused to allow testimony thereon 
(R. 89-90). 
Of course, nothing further was paid, a further notice to 
quit was served upon appellants on August 12, 1952, again 
not in the alternative, and this action was commenced Novem-
ber 8, 1952. · 
The complaint was brought in unlawful detainer, to quiet 
title in the respondents, to restore the land to them, for the 
unpaid amounts under the second lease agreement, for damages, 
and for attorney's fees (R. 11). 
. Defendants, in their answer, after admitting and denying 
the allegations of the complaint, set up alternative affirmative 
defenses. The first defense was that the warranty deed from 
P. K. Neilson to respondents and the real estate contract be-
tween respondents and appellants, both executed June 27, 1947, 
were in fact a mortgage (R. 23). The defendants further plead-
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ed tender of the sums due under the various agreements after 
receipt of the notice to quit served March 5, 1952 (Ds' Ex. 5) 
and also such tender after receipt of the notice to quit served 
August 12, 1952 (R. 22-23). Defendants further pleaded in 
the alternative that the first and second lease agreements were 
in truth and fact extensions and modifications of the original 
real estate contract, that strict performance of the terms and 
conditions of the original contract were waived, that defend-
ants had substantially performed thereunder and were therefore 
not in default, were entitled to continue with the contract, and 
were entitled to attorney's fees (R. 23-24). They further 
pleaded that if respondents, under the several contracts, had 
the right to repo~sess the property, then under the rule of 
Perkins v. Spencer, supra, they were entitled to relief from 
. . 
forfeiture and that the notice to quit of _August 12, 1952, 
under which the unlawful detainer action was brought, did not 
comply with law (R. 24). 
Appellants thereafter filed a motion for summary judg-
ment under the mortgage theory set forth above and respond~nts _ 
filed a counter-motion for summary judgment, to strike the 
answer, and for a general judgment (R-. 26-27). The trial 
court, in a memorandum decision, denied the appellants' mo-
tion for summary judgment under the mortgage theory (R . 
. 28-50). Though this was urged as error at the commencement 
of appeal, the appellants abandon this theory and we shall 
discuss it no further. The trial court also construed the uni-
form ·real estate contract and the first and second lease agree-
ments as separate and independent contracts, stating th?-t the 
·uniform real estate contract was incorporated into the first 
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and second lease agreements for two purposes only: 
(a) The fixing of the terms of the new Uniform 
~eal Estate Contract, conditionally agreed to be entered 
tnto, and 
(b) To determine the extent and nature of accumu-
lations to the obligations of the defendants in order 
that the promised new Uniform Real Estate Contract 
and the interim conditional agreements may assure the · 
respective parties receipt by each of their respective 
entitlements under the original arrangement, despite 
confessed violations· (R. 42). 
The court then held that the appellants were, under the second 
lease agreement, tenants at will, that the notice to quit of Aug-
ust 12, 1952 (Ps' Ex. I) was adequate under· the statute, 
though not in the alternative. The memorandum decision does 
not discuss or mention the notice to quit of March 5, 1952, 
also not in the alternative, nor does it discuss or mention the 
tender of payments due made immediately thereafter by ap-
pellants. Presumptively, the court felt this unimportant in view 
of its position that appellants were tenants at will of re-
spondents under the second lease agreement. The court then 
ordered that the respondents have judgment against appellants 
for immediate restitution of the premises, but. restrained them 
from selling or encumbering the same until :final disposition 
of the cause, unless a bond was :filed to secure payment of any 
sums ultimately determined to be due appellants. It ordered 
that respondents prepare findings, conclusions, judgment, and 
a writ for possession, conditioned on the . bond being :filed 
. (R. 49). The bond was never :filed, and no. papers as described 
above were filed. 
The trial court reserved the following issues of fact for 
1( 
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determination by the jury: 
1. What is the total amount of defendants' payments 
toward the purchase of the property under Exhibits 
UA," HB," and UC" [the uniform real estate contract, 
and the first and second lease agreements J ? 
2. What is the reasonable value of permanent im-
provements, if any, placed upon the premises during 
their possession ? 
3. What is the reasonable value of damages, if any, 
caused to the premises by the defendants' occupancy? 
4. What is the reasonable rental value of the prop-
erty during all of the time of defendants' occupancy? 
5. What further damages have plaintiffs suffered, 
if any, by reason of defendants' unlawful detainer? 
6. What is a rea~onable attorney's fee for plaintiff's 
counsel? 
The court further reserved as an issue of law the question 
whether plaintiffs were entitled to an award of any attorney's 
fee. 
The case was then tried to a jury on the issues reserved 
above. The jury returned a special verdict, finding that appel-
lants had paid, under all three instruments, a total of $8,687.41 
on principal and interest, taxes and assessments, insurance 
premiums and attorney's fees. It further found that appellants 
had caused no damage to the premises during their occupancy, 
that the reasonable market value of the property, both on June 
27, 1947 and on September 15, 1952, was $14,000.00, that 
the reasonable rental value of the premises during the period 
of occupancy by appellants was $85.00 per month, and that 
a reasonable attorney's fee for respondents in the case was 
$500.00 (R. 63-64). 
11 
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The trial court then made its analysis of the case (R. 
(79-86), awarding appellants a net judgment of $331.30 
which it found to be a net penalty, and denying respondents 
an attorney's fee on the authority of Forrester v. Cook (1930) 
77 Utah 137, 292 Pac. 206. Costs were, of course, awarded to 
respondents. . . 
The manner in which the trial court arrived at the net 
penalty of $331.30 is best illustrated in the conclusions of law 
( R. 98-101). The court concluded that the uniform real estate. 
contract was mutually terminated by agreement of the parties 
under the first lease agreement, and that thereafter, during the 
term of the first and of the second lease agreements, and until 
September 15, 1952, appellants were tenants at will of re-
. spondents ( R. 99) . From that date until the trial, it concluded 
appellants were guilty of unlawful detainer (R. 99). It then 
concluded, under the authority of Perkins v. Spencer, supra, 
that the difference between the amount paid from June 27, 
1947 to April, 1949, under the uniform real estate contract 
($5,060.00) and a reasonable rental at $85.00 per month for 
the same period ($1,870.00) was a penalty, unenforceable, 
and that appellants were therefore entitled to a gross credit 
of $3,190.00 (R. 99) ~ 
The trial court then granted respondents, as set-off, the 
total of all unpaid payments, both toward principal and in-
terest and toward taxes, assess:ffients, and insurance premiums 
unpaid uncle~ t~e second lease agreement, with interest on each · 
such payment from due date until April 1, 195 3, this, accord-
ing to the court, amounting to $1,328.70 (R. 82-83, 99-100). 
(It should be noted that delinquent payments under the first 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lease agreement were paid up before execution of the second 
lease agremnt [R. 71 J). It then granted as furthe~ set-off, 
treble the reasonable tental from September 15, 1952, as 
damages for unlawful detainer, ·amounting to $1,530.00 (R. 
100). These set-offs, when added and the total subtracted from 
the gross penalty thus determined, left the net judgment for 
appellants of $331.30. 
One additional matter bears note. When this action was 
commenced, the parties were considerably apart in their view 
as to how much had been paid to respondents by appellants 
(See Swan's Deposition, pages 11, 17-19, Jacobson's Deposi-
tion 24, 26, Ds' Exs. 1, 2). Until after this action was com-
. menced, respondents claimed that there was $9,600.00 owing 
them (Jacobson's Deposition 26-27, Swan's Deposition 11, 
17-19), and this, though the jury found the appellants had 
already paid $4,687.41 on what amounted to a ·$10,000 loan! 
One wonders what the $3,287.41 was paid for. At the trial, 
the difference in testimony as to what had been paid was not 
so great but this issue still had to be resolved by the jury. 
It is appellants' position that the two so-called leases were 
in fact modifications of the terms of the original uniform real 
estate contract, that on March 5, 1952, when served with the 
notice to quit, (Ds' Ex. 5) appellants were still purchasers 
under that contract, and respondents wrongfully refused the 
tender of sums then delinquent, made by appellants immediately 
~pon receipt of that notice to quit. Further, neither this notice 
to quit, nor the one served August 12, 1952, upon which th_e 
unlawful detainer action was based, was in the alternative, 
allowing appellants to pay delinquent payments or v~cate, and 
13 
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they thus did not comply with law. Pacific Development Co. 
I'. Stewart, supra. Respondents, therefore, wrongfully termi-
nated the contract. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF JUNE. 
27, 1947, WAS TERMINATED BY THE SO-CALLED 
LEASES OF APRIL, 1949, AND OF JUNE 27,· 1950. THESE 
INSTRUMENTS WERE IN TRUTH AND FACT MERELY 
EXTENSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS OF THE ORIGI-
NAL UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF JUNE 27, 
1947, THAT CONTRACT WAS NEVER PROPERLY OR 
LAWFULLY TERMINATED, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE GRANrED THE DEFENDANTS (PUR-
CHASERS) RELIEF FROM A FORFEITURE OF SUMS 
PAID THEREUNDER. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ·THAT 
ANY OF THE NOTICES TO QUIT SERVED UPON THE 
APPELLANTS (PURCHASERS) COMPLIED WITH THE 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT, 
AFTER MARCH 5, 1952, APPELLANTS MADE NO TEN-
DER OF SUMS DUE UNDER THE CONTRACTS, IN RE-
FUSING TESTIMONY ON THIS ISSUE, AND IN NOT 
SUBMITTING IT TO THE JURY. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AP-
PELLANTS WERE, AT THE TIME OF ENTRY OF JUDG-
MENT, STILL DETAINING THE PREMISES UNLAW-
FULLY, OR DETAINING THEM AT ALL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF JUNE 
27, 1947, WAS TERMINATED BY THE SO-CALLED 
LEASES OF APRIL, 1949, AND OF JUNE 27, 1950. THESE 
INSTRUMENTS WERE IN TRUTH AND FACT MERELY 
EXTENSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS OF THE ORIGI-
NAL UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF JUNE 27, 
1947, THAT CONTRACT WAS NEVER PROPERLY OR 
LAWFULLY TERMINATED, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENDANTS (PUR-
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CHASERS) RELIEF FROM A FORFEITURE OF SUMS 
PAID THEREUNDER. 
We begin our argument by drawing to the court's atten-
tion a well established rule of construction of contracts-
that they are construed strictly against t~e party who drafts 
them. This is particularlf so where the instrument is a lease or 
other contract affecting land, and is drafted by counsel for the 
landlord. Lori, Limited, Inc., et al. v. Wolfe et al., ( 1948) 
192 P. 2d 112, 85 Cal. App. 2d 54; Golden v. Mount, (Wash. 
1949) 203 P. 2d 667. Further, where a lease is capable of 
more than one construction, it will be construed in favor of · 
the tenant, unless he himself prepares it. Powerine Co. v. 
Russell's Inc., et al., ( 1943) 103 Utah 441, 135 P. 2d 906; 
Anderson v. Ferguson· et al., (Wash. 1943) 135 P. 2d 302. 
It will be noted that the first and the second le~se agree-
ments were drawn by the attorney for respondents, . and were 
drawn to meet their approval (Jacobson's Deposition 16-17, 
21) . It will be further noted that the trial court, without hesi-
tation, held in its memorandum decision upon respondents' 
motion for summary judgment, that the first and second lease . 
agreements were clearly and unambiguously separate and dis-
tinct contracts, independent of each other and of the original . · 
uniform r:eal estate contract. Refering to the first lease agree-
ment, the court stated: 
* * * No language could be clearer as to· the termi-
nation as a contract between the parties of Exhibit · 
(A.'' [the uniform real estate contract J * * * It was 
a new .agreement which adopted no terms of ~he old, 
16. 
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is complete and entire in itself and refers to the old 
one only for the purpose of :fixi~g the consideration for 
the new. 
The reasoning need not be reiterated (because it 
would vary only in inconsequential detail) in consider-
ing Exhibit ~~C." [the second lease agreement] It is 
likewise a complete new agreement referring to nA" 
(the uniform real estate contract J and n B" [the first 
lease agreement J only for the purpose of providing a 
contingent right for the defendants to have a new con-
tract o~ purchase (R. 45-46). 
The court concluded that the parties by mutual agreement as 
evidenced by the first and second lease agreements terminated 
the uniform real estate contract, as of April, 1949, and that 
the appellants were, from then until September 15, 1952, 
tenants at will of the respondents under the first and second 
lease agreements (R. 98-99). (We shall revert to this tenant-
at-will theory later) . 
. This leads to a very interesting proposttlon. It will be 
remembered that the trial court applied the rule of Perkins 
v. Spencer, supra, to the uniform real estate contract, determin-
ing that in April, 1949, when the court found ·the real estate 
contract was terminated, appellants were entitled. to a gross 
refund, as an unenforceable penalty, of $3,190.00. Then, 
applying this to all delinquencies, with ·interest, under the 
second lease agreement, ·there remained due the appellants 
from this penalty sum, on March 28, 195 3, the date of the 
trial court's decision on reserve issues, the sum of $331.30. It 
will be further recalled that the second lease agreement ended 
by its terms on May 31, 1953. If the $331.30 due appellants 
at the time of trial were applied to the rent for March, April 
17 
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and May, 1953, at $100.00 per month, there would remain the 
sum of $3,1.30 due appellants, appellants would have per-
formed under the terms of the second lease agreement, and 
\vould be entitled to enter into a new real estate contract, similar 
to the first, and be credited with all payments theretofore made 
t.aul er I he first recti estate ocntract, the first and sec.nnd lease 
dgrce1uents! Appellants, then, never were in default under 
the second lease agreement, because they were entitled to use 
as a set-off sums due them from termination of the uniform 
real estate contract dated June 27, 1947, which the court found 
\vas ter1uinated by the parties in April, 1949, and which was 
incorporated in the two lease agreements only to define the 
tenns of the contemplated new real estate contract. 
The theory of the respondents is no less interesting. 
From their argument in the trial court, and from their third 
statement of points to be relied on upon appeal, we take their 
position to be this: The Perkins ·v. Spencer rule applies to the 
original unnform real estate contract, and a portion of sums 
paid in by appellants is in fact a penalty. However, this 
amount representing a penalty was given up as consideration 
by appellants for respondents' executing the first lease agree-
ment. This is indeed a bargain, as the amount thus paid as 
consideration on a one year lease was a mere $3,190.00 plus 
$100.00 per month for the term, plus taxes, insurance and 
assessments! Another trouble with this theory is that, if appel-
lants performed the first and second lease agreements, then, 
by their very terms, this same $3,190.00 was to be credited, with 
all other payments, toward payment on a new uniform real 
estate contract in the same terms as the old. This might be 
18 
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denominated the ndouble-or-nothing, theory. 
This argument, we believe, merely spotlights the real · 
objective of respondents through the entire transaction-to 
avoid, somehow, that rule of law whereby the courts" will not 
enforce a provision for liquidated damages when that provi-
sion in fact is for a penalty or forfeiture, and when damages 
are readily ascertainable. 
The trial court concluded that the appellants were, from 
April, 1949, to September 15, 1952, tenants at will merely 
(R. 46-47, 99). With this conclusion we respectfully differ. 
As we conceive it, the nature of an estate in land is de-
. . 
termined by its incidents, and not by what the parties happen 
to call it. This Court has certain! y never hesitated to find an 
estate to be in · fact other than what it is denominated in a 
grant. Duerden v. Solomon} et al.J (1908) 33 Utah 468, 94 
Pac. 978; Hess v. AngerJ (1918) 53 Utah 186, 177 Pac. 232; 
Corey v. Roberts} ( 1933) 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940; Brown 
v. -SkeenJ ( 1936) 89 Utah 568, 58 P. 2d 24; Bybee v. Stewart} 
(1948) 189 P. 2d 118; J\!orthcrestJ Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust 
Co.J (1952) 248 P. 2d 692. 
An estate at will is defined by the American Law Institute· 
Restatement of the Law of Pro pertyJ section 21: 
An estate at will is an estate which is terminable at 
the will of the transferor and also at' the will of the 
transferee and which has no other designated period 
of duration. (Emphasis added). 
The death of either the landlord or the tenant operates as an 
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automatic termination of such estate. 32 A.J. 83, Landlord & 
Tenant § 76. Where a lease is for a fixed term, with an option 
in one of the parties, either lessee, or lessor, but not in the other, 
to tt rrninate before end of the tenn, the estate is not one at will. 
32 A.J. 82, 708, Landlord & Tenant, § 66, 831. Statutes con-
c<.:rning tenancies at will are held not to be applicable to 
leases for definite periods, though terminable if covenants 
therein contained were not fulfilled. Andrews v. Russell, 
( 1927) 259 Pac. 113, 85 Cal App 149; West Pub. Co. Key 
No. Landlord & Tenant 103t{ 1). 
In the case before the Court it will be noted that in both 
the first and second _lease agreements, "the heirs, executors, 
administrators and assigns of the respective parties" are bound 
by the terms. The grant in the first lease agreement is ((on a 
month-to-month basis for a period commencing May 1, 1949, 
and ending no· later than April 30, 1950." In the second lease 
agreement the. grant, so far as material to this case, is ((on 
a month-to-month basis for a period commencing September 
1, 1950, and ending May 31, 1953." The succeeding paragraph 
in this second lease agreement refers to the ~ppellants' becom-
ing umonth-to-month tenants commencing September 1, 1950." 
This second lease agree·ment contains other provisions bear-
ing on this question. We quote: 
And ·the Lessees further. agree to deliver up· said 
premises to Lessors at the expiration of said term in as 
good order and condition as when the same were enter-
ed upon by Lessees, * * * 
Lessees further covenant and agree that if said ren~ 
above reserved, or any part thereof, shall be unpaid 
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for 15 days after the same shall becon1e due, or if de-
fault be made in any of the covenants herein contained 
to be kept by said Lessees, or if Lesses shall vacate such 
premises, it shall and may be lawful for Lessors, their 
legal representatives or assigns, without notice or legal 
process to re-enter and take possession of said premises 
and every and any part thereof, and re-let the same 
and apply the net proceeds so received upon the amount 
due ttnder this lease. (Emphasis added.) 
If we were to concede these instruments to be leases, they 
most certainly do not create tenancies at will. To be sure, 
appellants are denominated therein as tenants at wilL The 
estate is also called a nterm" and in each instance a definite 
term is fixed. Appellants are also called nmonth-to-month 
tenants." We are reminded of the phrase, nyou nam~. it, we 
got it." Notwithstanding these conflicts, contradictions, and 
ambiguities, the trial court stated that the parties nmust be held 
to their clear and explicit contracts," and declared appellants 
tenants at will (R. 46-47). 
·The common sense of the matter is simply this: The ap-
pellants, as they admitted, became in arrears in payments for 
their home. They never, it must be stated, admitted the amount 
of the arrearage to be that claimed by respondents, at any 
time. They were given a summary notice to quit the premises 
(Ds' Ex. 4). They immediately called upon respondent Emil 
J. Jacobson and his attorney to see if they could not work out 
some way of saving their rights in the premises. The first 
lease agreement, worked out between Jacobson and his own 
atto~,ney was offered as the answer. It should be remembered 
appellant George Swan i~ a cook (Swan's Deposition 2), 
and Mr. Jacobson is a real estate salesman (Jacobson's Depo-
21 
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sition 4-5). This agreement saved appellants' position for the 
n1oment, at least in their minds. The real estate contract of 
June 27, 1947, was made a part of this lease agreement. Appel-
lants became in arrears under this document as its terms drew 
to a close. Appellants made up these arrearages, but respond-
ents were still apparently not willing to enter into the new 
real estate contract provided for in the first lease agreement. 
At any rate, the second lease agreement was prepared in the 
same manner, and appellants executed it. 
In point of legal concept, these lease agreements made 
only one material change in the relationship of the parties, 
and that was in the amount of the payments to be made by 
appellants. The original" contract contained a provision that 
time was of the essence, and that the seller could, upon default 
of the buyer, constitute the latter a tenant at will. The second 
lease agreement, under which the unlawful detainer action 
was brought, merely gave the ((lessors" the rrright to remove 
the Lessees from possession as tenants at will in the event" 
they did not keep up the payments. They had this right under 
the original contract. Under all the instruments, appellants 
in fact became, upon default, tenants at will of respondents 
only upon the election of the latter. We revert to this propo-
sition under our Point II. Again we state, the only difference 
in point of law of the. positions of the parties under the lease 
agreements and the original contract was in the amounts to 
be paid per month. Otherwise, appellants had a right to enter 
into a ((new" contract of purchase, exactly like the one of June 
27, 1947, and moreover, to be credited with payment thereon 
for all sums paid under the so-calle? leases. All other provi-
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sions of the lease agreements,. except for the preliminary 
recitals, find their legal counterparts in the original real estate 
contract. We respectfully submit that these so-called leases 
\\~ere in truth and in fact n1erely modifications of provisions 
in the original real estate contract for manner and amount of 
payment to be made by appellants in their purchase of the 
property, and that at least until March 5, 1952, they were 
vendees under that contract. 
We have found no Utah cases dealing with precisely this 
type of instrument. An interesting device is apparently used 
in Kansas, where the owner leases property to . one, with 
monthly rent reserved, and with further provisions that the 
sale price is a stated amount, and when rental paid equals 
that amount, the property shall be conveyed to the ((tenant," 
but if there is a default in the payment of such nrent," sums 
theretofore paid shall be forfeited. When substantial amounts 
have been paid under such an arrangement, the Kansas court . 
treats it is a contract of sale and applies the doctrine of equitable 
conversion. See Stevens et al v. McDowell} Judge, ( 1940) 98 
P. 2d 410, 151 Kan. 316, and cases therein cited. On March 5, 
1952, when the summary notice to quit was served upon ap-
pellants and after which payment was refused by respondents, 
appellants had paid a total of $8,687.41 toward purchase of 
the premises in dispute. We respectfully submit that these so-
called leases are, and were intended at the time they were draft-
d, a device whereby respondents attempted to avoid the rule 
of damages as set forth in Perkins v. Spencer} supra, and fur-
ther, that this device is transparent on its face. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
AN\r OF THE NOTICES TO QUIT SERVED UPON THE 
APPELLANTS (PURCHASERS) COMPLIED WITH THE 
LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH ON UNLAWFUL DE-
.,./\INER. 
Though we were to concede that the appellants were 
merely tenants of respondents under the second lease agree-
ment, still our position is that such tenancy was wrongfully 
terminated on March 5, 1953. If they were held to be mere 
tenants, appellants also had, by terms of the lease, an option 
to purchase, which option, in view of the sums already paid 
to respondents to be credited to such purchase, was most valu-
able. 
The notice to quit of March 5, 1952, was, it will be re-
called, summary in form, without alternative. So aJso was the 
notice served August 12, 1952 (Ps' Ex I).· These notices could 
. suffice only if served on the theory appellants were at the time 
tenants at will, under section 78-36-3 subsection (2), Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, and of course this is precisely what the 
trial court determined appellants to be. We have already, under 
Point· I of this brief, discussed this tenant-at-will proposi,tion, 
and analyzed the instruments to show th·at, whatever relation-
ship appellants had, it was not that of tenant at will. We shall 
develop this argument further, assuming only for the purpose 
of argument that appellants were tenants and not purchas-ers. 
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agreement as the basis for holding appellants to be tenants at 
will under that agreement. We quote that paragraph: 
It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that 
the purpose of this contract is to allow the Lessees a 
reasonable opportunity to· reinstate their right to pur-
chase said property but at the same time to preserve the 
Lessors' right to remove the Lessees from possession 
as tenants at will in the event the latter do not perform 
according to the terms of this contract. (Emphasis 
added.) 
It will be observed that this gives respondents a right to re-
move appellants for default. It does not provide that default 
shall operate as an automatic ~ermination of the estate. Berg-
man et al v. Lewis, ( 1926) 68 Utah 178, 249 Pac. 470; Hoh-
worth v. Mills,. (1923) 62 Utah 474, 221 Pac. 165. The rest 
of this agreement negatives the automatic· termination through 
default. Paragraph ( 3) contemplates the execution of a new 
real estate contract upon perfo_rmance of the terms of the so-
called lease. Paragraph ( 5) provides that the ((lessees" .will 
deliver up the premises at the end of the term in good condi-
tion, and will not sub-let during the term. Paragraph ( 6) gives 
the respondents, upon default by appellants, the right to re- · 
enter, re-let, ((and apply the net proceeds so received upon the · 
amount due ·under this lease." Paragraph ( 8) provides that 
the party at fault shall ((pay all costs and expenses that may 
. arise from enforcing this agreement,'·' and paragraph (9) pro-
vides that the agreement shall be binding on ·((the heirs, ex-
ecutors, administrators and assigns of the respective parties 
hereto." When viewed in its entirety, the agreement cannot 
be said to make default in payment by appellants operate as 
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•• 
an automatic termination-it simply cannot be said that para-
graph ( ·1) is a special limitation on the estate created. 
'l'he An1ericc1Jl Law Institute Restatement of the Law of 
Property, § 23, defines a special limitation: 
1'he term "special limitation" denotes that part of 
the language of a conveyance which causes the created 
interest automatically to expire upon the occurrence of 
a stated event, and thus provides for a terminability 
in addition to that normally characteristic of such in-
terest. 
Section 24 defines a condition subsequent: 
The term ((condition subsequent" denotes that part 
of the language of a conveyance, by virtue of which 
upon the occurrance of a stated event the conveyor, 
or his successor in interest, has the power to terminate 
the interest which has been created subject to the condi-
tion subsequent, but which will continue until this 
power is exercised. 
Paragraph b. of the Comment under this latter section states: 
Whenever an estate subject to a condition subsequent 
is created, some person has the power to terminate this 
estate upon the occurrence of the stipulated event. 
Thus such an estate does not end automatically and 
by expiration as does an estate subject to a special 
limitation. On the contrary, it is cut short, or divested, 
if, but only if, the person having the power chooses to 
exercise it. (Emphasis added.) 
Whether a provision in a conveyance is a special limitation or 
a condition subsequent is one of interpretation. See Annota-
tion, 118 ALR 283, 292. 
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Indeed, the above principles are well established in this 
state, the above quotations from the Restatement being merely 
declaratory of what this Court has already determined to be 
the law. Hohzl'ortb v. Mills, supra; Bergman et al v. Lewis, 
Supra; Leone et al. v. Zuniga et al., (1934) 84 Utah 417, 34 
P. 2d 699, 94 ALR 123!2. Ambiguous leases are construed in 
favor of the tenant, and conditions involving forfeiture must 
be strictly interpreted against the party for whose benefit they 
are created. Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., et al., and Anderson 
v. Ferguson et al., supra. See also West Pub. Co. Key No. 
Landlord & Tenant§ 47, 163(1), 108(2). 
We respectfully submit the most that can be said for re-
spondents was that paragraph ( 4) of the second lease agree-
ment created a condition subsequent-it gave the respondents a 
right to declare a termination of the agreement, but they had 
a choice to exercise it or not. They could, under their theory, as 
well have re-entered, re-let, and held appellants for the differ-
ence thus realized and that due under the contract up to May 
31, 195 3. That provision being a condition subsequent, respond-
ents had to exercise their right to declare appellants' term ended 
by virtue of the default. This they could do by notice to quit 
under section 78-36-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, but we 
further submit that such notice must, under the applicable por-
tion of that statute, subsection ( 3) , or possibly ( 5) , be in 
the alternative-to perform or. to vacate. 
Of course, we still maintain that, at least until March 5,. 
1952, appellants were in fact contract purchasers, as argued 
under Point I of this brief. As such, they were of course, en-
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titled to an alternative notice, under the statute cited above; 
\vhith notice they were never given. Pacific Development Co. 
l'. Stewart, supra. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
' AFTER MARCH 5, 1952, APPELLANTS MADE NO TEN-
DER OF SUMS DUE UNDER THE CONTRACTS, IN RE-
FUSING TESTIMONY ON THIS ISSUE, AND IN NOT 
SUR1\1ITTING IT TO THE JURY. 
In their answer, appellants plet;tded that, immediately 
after receiving the notice to quit of March 5, 1952, they made 
a tender of all sums due respondents to that date, but respond-
ents refused to accept such tender (R. 22-23). The trial court, 
in its memorandum decision, did not even mention this is.sue, 
and, of course, did not reserve it for the jury. At the trial, 
~ppellants offered the notice as an exhibit (Ds' Ex. 5). The 
appellants then. made a proffer of proof on this issue. 
Appellants . had pleaded substantial performance, the 
tender of March, 1952, and its refusal, and had prayed for 
specific performance of the contract, including their cost and 
attorneys' fees under the contract. At the end of the trial appel-
lants moved for leave to amend in order to seek. damages for 
wrongful termination of the contract, which motion was denied. 
Appellants thus persisted in asserting their· right to perform 
under the contract, their attempt so to do, and in asserting the 
insufficiency of the notice to quit of March 5, 1952. 
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It might be argued that the notice of March 5, 1952, 
constituted the termination of the contract, and that therefore 
the notice to quit of August 12, 1952, under which the unlaw-
full detainer action was brought, need not be in the alternative. 
This completely ignores what, under appellants' theory, 
1s a very important matter-appellants were, under section 
78-36-3 (3) or (5), Utah Code Annotated 1953 and the law.of 
Pacific Development Co. Z'J. Stewart, supra, entitled to an 
opportunity to bring their payments current. Appellants main-
tain that a tender ·of these sums was .made immediately upon 
service of the notice of March 5, 1952, but refused by appel-
lants. This is material, both on the question of treble damages 
for unlawful detainer, and on the question of wrongful . ter-
mination of the contract by respondents. 
In view of section 78-21-1, Utah Cade Annotated 1953, 
appellants were entitled as a matter. of right to have this ques-
tion of tender go to the jury, as this is an action for recovery 
of specific real property; instead, the trial court kept the issue · 
from the jury, and made a finding thereon without admitting 
evidence. This, we respectfully submit, was error. . Valley . 
Mortuary v. Fairbanks ( 1950) ---- Utah, 225, Pac. 2d 739. 
POINT· IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AP-
PELLANTS WERE, AT THE TIME OF ENTRY OF JUDG-
MENT, STILL DETAINING THE PREMISES UNLAW-
FULLY, OR DETAINING THEM AT ALL. 
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In their answer, appellants asserted substantial perform-
ance, and the right to bring p,ayments to date and continue with 
the contract of purchase (R. 23·-25). Throughout the entire 
u>urse in the trial court, appellants insisted on this right (R. 
7(), 85-86). They refused to treat the contract of purchase as 
tc nninated. 
In its memorandum decision, the trial court granted on 
sumn1ary judgment, the right to immediate possession to the 
respondents, provided they filed a bond to protect rights that 
might be determined to be in appellants (R. 49). No findings, 
conclusions, interlocutory decree, writ or bond was, filed in 
compliance with this decision. 
The trial was concluded, and special verdict entered March 
18, 1953 (R. 75). Appellants still pursued their theory, seek-
ing damages for wrongful termination of contract (R. 76). The 
final decision of the court was rend~red March 28, 1952 (R. 
77), but the respondents did not prepare and submit findings 
of fact and conclusions of law until June 9, 195 3 (R. 101, 106). 
Appellants finally concluded to yield up possession, mov-
ing out on March 23, 195 3, and turning the premises over to 
respondents April11, 1953 (R. 104). Their reason for so doing 
is quite obvious; it most certainly was not an abandonment of 
their theory. 
Yet respondents submitted, June 9, 195 3, almost two 
months later, findings of fact and conclusions of law, wherein 
it was found that the appellants, at that date, were withholding 
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We draw this to the Court's attention because, even under 
our theory of the case, respondents are without doubt entitled 
to a reasonable rental for the actual period of occupancy by 
appellants, but only for such period. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the propositions that the two so-called leases were 
merely modifications of the manner of payment to be made as 
provided in the uniform real estate contract, that appellants 
were then contract purchasers of the premises in dispute at 
least until March 5, 1952, that the notices to quit did not com-
ply with the requirements of section 78-36-3, Utah Code Anno-
tated 195 3, and that the respondents wrongfully terminated 
the contract of purchase by refusing the tender of sums due 
thereunder made March 5, 1952, one further matter remains 
for consideration, and that is t~e issue of damages. 
So far as respondents are concerned, we believe the trial 
court correctly denied them attorney's fees, under the provi-
sions of the contracts and the case of Forrester v. Cook} supra. 
On the authority of that case and Perkins v. Spencer, supra, 
we also believe that respondents were not entitled to treble 
damages from September 15, 1952, for the reason that the 
action wherein that is allowed is statutory, and the notices to 
quit did not meet statutory requirements. 
But the case before this Court differs from those cases 
cited. It is our position that, on March 5, 1952, appellants_were 
entitled to bring their payments current, Pacific Development 
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Co. t'. Stewart, supra. Furthermore, we assert that appellants 
tnade tender at that time to do this, but such tender was refused 
by respondents. The record is replete with evidence that even 
a ftt-r commencement of this action attempts were made to P?-Y 
up on the contract, but these attempts were blocked by re-
sp< >ndents. They simply. would not agree on what amount was 
due (See Depositions of George W. Swan and Emil J. Jacob-
son). 1 t is, therefore, our position that the contract was termi-
nated wrongfully by respondents, and appellants are therefore · 
entitled to damages. 
In view of the special verdict of the jury in this case, ap-
pellants would be entitled, under the rule of Perkins v. Spencer, 
supra, to a refund of all sums paid in, less a reasonable rental 
for the period of occupancy. In that case, however, the notice 
\\·as in the alternative, and the purchasers did not· perform. 
The question of damages ·for wrongful termination was not 
before the court. In the case of McBride v. Stewart et al., 
( 1926) 68 Utah 12, 249 Pac. 114, 48 ALR 267, this Court 
considered the element of damages for wrongful termination 
of a real estate contract by the vendor, awarding to the pur-
chaser the amount paid in less a reasonable rental. However, 
in that case that sum was all that was sought. In the case of 
Dunshee v. Geoghegan ( 1891), 7 Utah 113, 25 Pac. 731, this 
Court allowed as damages for breach of contract for sale of 
land by the vendor all sums paid in plus appreciation in value 
of the premises, an element not present in this case und.er the 
jury verdict. See also 55 A.J. 948, Vend or and Purchaser, § 555, 
Annotations; 48 ALR 12, 68 ALR 137. 
Nor does this case come within the rule of Federal Land 
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Bank of Berkeley v. Sorenson et al., ( 1942) 101 Utah 305, 
121 Pac. 2d 398. In this case appellants pleaded substantial 
compliance and waiver of strict performance. The reccrd shows 
that from June, 1950, to March, 1952, payments had not been 
made in strict compliance . with the second lease agreement 
(Ds' Exs. 1, 2, 6). Then, March 5, 1952, appellants were given 
a notice that the contract was terminated, and their tender of 
sums due to date was refused. Then, before the second notice 
of August 15, 1952, appellants had obtained a commitment 
to re-finance and pay off the entire obligation to respondents, 
but respondents effectively blocked this through claiming the 
amount due as $9,600.00 (Swan's Deposition 16-19, Jacob-
son's Deposition 26-27). The trial court gave no weight what-
soever· to these matters. 
Certainly, on the facts of this case, respondents are en-
titled to a reasonable rental for the period of occupancy by 
the appellants. To hold otherwise would result in an unjust 
enrichment of appellants. 
We respectfully submit, however, that appellants are en-
titled to judgment for all sums paid in excess of this amount. 
A reasonable rental, $85.00 per month, from June 27, 1947, 
to March 27, 1953\, would total $5,865.00. The jury determined 
that appellants had paid a total of $8,687.41. This leaves as 
a penalty the sum of $2,822.41. We further submit t~at appel-· 
lants are entitled to a judgment for the costs of defending this 
action, including a reasonable attorney's fee. All three contracts 
provided for a reasonable attorney's fee for enforcing them. 
Appellants have certainly attempted to enforce these agree-
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tnents, ·but have been prevented from so doing by the wrong-
ful conduct of respondents. Appellants, moreover, are entitled 
to interest on the amount thus recoverable. 55 A.J. 953, Vendor 
and Purchaser, § 5 59. 
W <: ask this Court to determine that Appellants, under all 
three contracts, were purchasers of the premises in question, 
that the forfeiture provisions in those contracts results in a 
penalty, and therefore are not enforceable, and to remand this 
case for the purpose of determining whether a tender of sums 
due was made by appellants on March 5, 1952, and for the 
purpose of determining the amount of appellants' damages for 
'" rongful termination of the contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYH. IVIE 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
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